.
A Complaint
Garne theory and decision theory are eongenial, or so at least one .would expect from their akin subject matter and their akin basic concepts and methods. And this expectation is justified by first inspeetion of the standard aeeounts of these theories: Decision theory investigates rational behaviour of single persons in isolation; game theory is eoncerned with the rationality of mutually dependent decisions of several ' . persons; thus game theory is the more embracing theory, leaving to de-' " cis ion theory the special ease of one-person games or, aeeording to a '. rather unfortunate phrase, of games against nature.
Upon eloser inspeetion, however, the standard aeeounts of garne theory . ' and its relation to decision theory appear quite unsatisfactory. Of • course, decision theory, too, is clouded by problems; but in comparison, I think, game theory is additionally sapped by three connected disconeernments: it is, to put it strongly, eonfused about the rationality concept appropriate to it, its assurnptions about its subjects (the players) are very unclear, and, as a cODsequence, it is unclear about the deeision rules to be applied. Or in other, somewhat paradoxieal words: Decision theory may be a specialization of game theory (viewed from game theory), but game theory as presented today is never a generalization of decision theory (viewed from deeision theory). Rather, in antieipation, game theory should be viewed as a speeialization of deeision theory. This is my complaint. I shall substantiate it in the sUbsequent sections and explain how I think it should be remedied.
The reader may suspect that the objections are directed to the lligher , .' " ' , ..
• ,., '~'.'f ·. ··· , -<' .. :;;. "'""~"' .:
• First publ. in: Philosophy of economics : proceedings, Munich, July 1981 / ed. by W. Stegmüller ... (eds.) . Berlin [u.a.] : Springer, 1982, pp. 239-270 (Studies in contemporary economics ; 2) Konstanzer and dimiller regions of game theory such as three-or-more-person games or games in characteristie fune t ion fo rm, and then he may perhaps concede them wi l lingly. Bu t, on th e c on t rary, they address to the seemingly clean ' and settled bas e , to two-pers o n zero-sum games. For th e sak~ of perspicui ty I shall deal , only wi th games in nOLIlial fOLlll. 1 The reader mayaIso suspect a pleading f or a Bayesian game t h eory, a nd I shall indeed argue from a puristic Bayesian position. However, the label "Bayesian game theory" has become associated most notably with the , work of John C. Harsanyi, whieh seems to me to be still more game theoretic than decision theoretic in spirit and henee eriticizable on similar grounds as the standard accounts. Thus, there is a di f ference here which we have to take up in the last secti on.
In all that I am not c l aiming that the position set f orth here or any of the arguments for it would be new (though some twists may ' be). It is only that earlier attacks on game theory guided by the same spirit have , apparently been unable to stir up the received theory from its complacency and to set it on a better f o u nded path;and it is this fact which has lEid me, to make another try.
, 2. How to Make Sense of Game Theory Before substantiating the eomplaint, it is fair to outline the basic conviction on which it rests. This conviction is an orthodox Bayesian one:
According to it, people h ave aims and wishes, they 1ike the world to " be such and such; they have ' beli e fs, , they think the world to be such and such; and, if rational, they act so as to promote their wishes best according to their be1iefs. For t he sake of definiteness, decision theo-< ry formalizes this in quantitative decision models. In such a model forma1izing a person's deeision situation, this person is assumed to have .' . humeric subjective uti1ities and probabilities; then rational action is >defined as action maximizing expec ted ut i lity; and as a normative theory decision theory recommends rational action, while as an empirical theory it assumes rational action, weIl knowing that this is a strong idealization entitled at most to approximative validity. Nevertheless, this isa model which is claimed t o b e applicable in principle to each and every human action. (Thl ' S cla " t 't lm l S n o qUl e as strong as it may seem, since it is not to be extended to al l human behaviour. I t must be observed tha t action is a n h b h its c i reular behaviour to 240 arrower concept t an e aviour, and despite a i r it is not unreasonable to say that actions just are whieh deeision theory is applieable.2)
-. ' -~-'. '. , , I t is not really necessary here to go l'nto the details of the deeision t h eoretic formalization. But let us assume, for the sake of precision, that it is done in Savage 's wel l-known way, where probabilities are defined for a set of possible world states and where utilities refer to possible outcomes each of which is uniquely detennined by a world state and an action, so that the familiar utility matrix also found in two-person games in normal ,form ensues. For our diseussion this is the most suitable fonoalization. 3 th th ' s not qUJ,'te the usual story which is more cautious By e way, lS wa by trying to render the quantitative model as something derivative. It defines rational action aschoosing \>lhat is most preferred according to rational preferences; preferences are rational, if they satisfy some rather evident eonditions such as t ransitivity etc.; and th en, amazingly, it can be proven that rational action is such as if it maximized exp. ected utility. But this "as if" is almost as out of place as saying that bodies mov e through space, as if they had a mass, as i f t hey were obey i ng Newton's seeond law, etc. No, aceording to Newtonian mechanics bodies move the way they do, b e aaus e they have such and s uch a mass, because such and such forces are aeting upon them, etc., and according to decision theory people act the way they do, because they have soand so strong desires, because they have so and so firm beliefs, etc. Surely, there are a lot of subtleties hidden in this subjeet, about which philosophers of seienee are sti l l divided. But there is no doubt that philosophy of scienee has outmoded operationalism as expressed by the "as if" in physics and anywhere else. Turning now to game-l ike situations of mutually dependent decisions, is then anything of the above general characterization of decision situations to be revoked? No, nothing at all. Other persons and their behaviour are t o us just as mueh parts of the outer world as anything else, though eertainly rather complicated and often very dear ones. Formally, this means that in any player's decision model the possible h I re but parts of t he poss i ble world states. actions of the ot er p ayers a We may further take these possible actions as eonstituting a small world (in Savag e's technical sense; c f . Savage (1954) , sect. 5.5) and reduce the model to this small world -in effect, this is the same as reducing a game in extensive form t o contains the utility matrix its norwal form. Thus, the reduced model of this normal form, andthe r i g h t and onl-y way t o complete it is to add the p l ayer's subjective probabilities for 'C, (" -"" : ':' 10, . , ' ' i ' < i. " }: :,~:,,: ,: "j : , ,:,'" . . . . • ""I : " .) ":' , :" ' , , ;,' ':' ' ,' . .... ,"", " . '::,,+ . ...... ' ., . ,"" ,-:''''' ,,' " " , ...... , .. , '. , ,'''' , its possible world states, i.e. for the other players' aetions. After all this, the rational thing to do is, as always, to maximize expected utility; and that's it.
Indeed, very often there is nothing more to game-like situations. In so many of our daily routines we treat other people just as if they were regularly and reliably behaving automata, about which we have rather definite expectations without wasting any further thought; they figure in our decision problems in no other way as do, say, the traffic or weather eonditions. (This somewhat heartless talk is but a haLlnless "defoLlllation professionelle"; fortunately, we do, and are able to, take more interest in some people.)
But this being accepted, what realm is then left as peculiar to game theory? Game theory eommences, when we take other people in the outer " world seriously as persons, when we give up looking only at their be-" haviour and start theorizing about them, and in particular, when we dise ". . ' . cover that decision theory is approximately the right theory about them, whenwe try to figure out what their aims and beliefs may be, assuming '/ ,that they aet rationally. Note, however, that on this aceount game theo-
• ry does not embrace decision theory, but is rat her a specialization of it. Game theory is decision theory about special decision makers, namely about decision makers who theorize decision-theoretically about the other persons figuring in their decision situations.
5
All this probably sounds very familiar. It is just the orthodox Bayesian stand on game theory and more or less what Harsanyi, for instance, has told us so many times for more t h an twenty years. But strangely, everyone -standard game theorists anyway, but also Bayesians like Ha,rsa~yi (cf. the last section ) -seems to have sinned against the pure doctrine, to have shrinked from pushing it to i ts consequences. '. ' 'l'he sinning has i ts reasons, however. For i t seems difficult, if not . in,tPOssible, to justify within the pure Bayesian doctrine what everyone · , . ' held justified -that is: to justify equilibrium points as solutions of of two-persbn zero-sum games or generally of non-cooperative games (cf. section 4). Thus we must have a careful look at what can be concretely done with the hitherto sketchy doctr i ne without betraying it. But let me first i nspect the standard game theoretic reasoni ng for two-person zero-sum games from this Bayesian point of view. 
~ow Not t o MaXe Senseof Game Theory
To this end we should briefly recapitulate the received reasoning. I hope everyone ag re e s that Luce, Rai f fa (1957), eh. 4, and von Neumann,
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Morgens t ern (1944), eh. III, are not only representative for, but still among the most thorough and eonvincing accounts of this reasoning, so that I can bas e the recapitulation on them. It eonsists of four parts.
The standard story
Part 1 (pertinent to all games in normal fOLm): Let agame be g i v en in normal form. The basic problem of game theory then is, very vaguely stated, somehow to find out for each p l ayer which choice would be a good one for hirn. However, this is much too indeterminate a que stion; it need" , specification. So let us first assume that each player is rational eitheI in the loose sense o f trying to get out of the playas much as possible . (according to his utility function) or in the stricter sense "that, giver two alternatives, he willalways choose the one he prefers, i.e. the one . ' with th e larger utility" (Luce, Raiffa ' (1957) , p.55). And let us secondly .... assume that each player has full knowledge of the game in nOLrLtal fonn, . ' 1.e. that he is aware of every player' s possible alternatives (strate-:, :gies) and that he knows every player's utilities for the outcomes of all possible strategy combinations (which, in general, are already expected . utilities with regard to the chance moves of the game) .
Without the first assumption game theory could no t get off at all; for what general theory could there be about j.rrational action? And the second assumption is necessary, too; else the problem tackled by the game theorist might be the wrong one, i.e. different from the problem of the players as they subjectively see it. With these assumptions, however, we may hope to have rendered our problem specific enough to be solvable. So let us try to solve it:
Part 2 (pertinent to all non-cooperati ve games in nOLrnal form ) : A first consideration moves us ahead quite a bit. It says that, if game theory ' is to be at least potentially public -as it should doubtlessly be -, then it can distinguish only equilibrium strategies as rational choices for the players. (To be sure, so far I am talking only of pure strategies; mixed strategies do not come up until part 4.) Or more fully: Game theory is to find out for each player which choice would be a rational one for him; if it manages to do so, then each player can know as weIl as the game theorist hirnself, which choices would be rat i onal for the other players (since, according to the second assumption above, each player sees the game situation in the same way as the game th eorist); and since each player i s assumed to act rationally, this assumption must not be a reason to any player to deviate from what is rationa l for him according to th e theory ; hence only equilibrium po ints can be
, rational strategy combinations, and only equilibrium strategies, strategies leading to some such point can be rational choices.
• ~.e.
As is weIl known, this consideration is of varying force. choose, knowing what he has done. In the majorant game it is just the other way around. Obviously, in the minorant game Charlie is at most as weIl off as in the actual game, whereas in the majorant game he is at l .east as weIl off as in the actual game. And, as is equally obvious, the on.ly rational thing for hirn to do in the minorant game is to maximize his security level, and the only rational thing to do in the majorant game is to choose what is best against Lucy's security level maximizer (provided she has been so rational to take this choice). But both cases result in the same strategy combination and in the same utility for Charlie. Hence, for the actual game being "between" the minorant and the majorant game exactly this and no other thing is rational. There is another unclari ty. What does n rational n exactly me an as used in the rationality assumption? The explanation cited from Luce and Raiffa is of no great help, since preferences and utilities refer only to stra-
tegy combinations; nowhere in standard game theory is a preference order or even a utility function established solely for the alternatives of one player. So, one would like to have sharply specifiedanother, more utilizable sense of "rational". presumably, however, the question was the wrong one. Presumably,,,standard game theory thinks it preferable or unavoidable to leave "rational" vague in the initial assumptions and explanations, promising to render it precise later on. But for the moment, this is only to say that "rational" is intendedly vague, and this is no improvement.
The crux of the matter is this: Standard game theory does nowhere reason from the initial assumptions in a rigorous way; they are exclusively employed in plausibility arguments. The attitude seems to have beenthat first the intuitive grounds are to be prepared for the sub-. sequent exact theorizing, and that one need not weigh every word in ' . "preparation. Thus, some nice differences are blurred already at the . More generally: What part 2 shows is that the garne theorist cannot estab1ish some choice set as rational to the exclusion of eauilibrium strate-
• ' gies, but it has still to be shown on other grounds that a choice on1y among the equilibriurn strategies can be positively established as ~atio na1. Part 3 might prepare such grounds; so let us turn to it.
Ta pa pt 3: There has been a lot written about the decision rule of maximinimizing , and all the essential pros and cons are known. The present state of discussion is, I feel, a somewhat smoothed one. It seems to be generally accepted that maximinimizing cannot serve as abasie decision rule entitled to general applicability; it leads to absurdities in too many situations. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged as a discuss-
-,,, , " , ' :.,'
", , ' ' ,' "able, respectable, or even convincing decision rule in some types of situations, most notably in two-person zero-sum games , but also for decisions under uncertainty, in statistical decision theory, and more recent1y in Rawls' original position (c f . Rawls (1971) to have some basic decision rule from which the others may be derived.
But in trying to answer this demand with respect to game theory, we ob-'; viously rum straight into the obscurities found i n part 1.
To be sure, all I am doing here is to appeal to theoretical awareness. But I would like to make this appeal more pressing by the f0110w-ingargument.
I t has to do with Savage's small worlds -a subject whos e theoretical importance, I think, has only insufficiently been recognized, and which " is concerned wi th the fact that the descr iption of one and the same decis i on situation may be based on differen t worlds. Here , a world isloosely sp e aking, we need not really go into technical details -the co11ection of all the items which are explicitly to be considered in the description as relevant to th e decision situation. Savage's observation was now that there seems to be no good way of telling which is the right world on which to base the description of a given decision situation. Prima facie, it may seem plausible to put into a world each item which is in fact relevant, but in general this would yield unmanageably large wor1ds. So, ins tead of looking for the right world we should rather try to find out when two descript ions based on different worlds may be said to be equivalent. To this end Savage developed a method öf reducing a description based on a large world to a description based on va'lent to the a small world which may be warrantedly said to be first one. The essential feature of th e reduction uti-247 lities u i ; then the utility of a in the small-world description is to be the expectation value Ep.u .. 7
One might perhaps envisage other reduction methods (though one need not, I think); but what is important for us now is that, whatever reduction method is chosen, it must be such that the decision rule adopted is compatible with it. This means that, when the decision rule is applied to the large-world description, the same decision (in fact, the same preference order among the alternatives) must result as when the decision rule is applied to the reduced small-world description.BActually, it is somewhat misleading to say only that reduction method and decision rule must be compatible. Rather, the reduction method is the basia thing to be chosen, and then the decision rule ensues as a mere special case;
for the decision rule effects nothing but a maximal reduction to the minimal description which explicitly considers only the alternatives of the decision maker and nothing else.
The next point to observe is that the reduction method which is the natural generalization of the decision rule of maximinimizing is a wild one, indeed. According to it, the utility of a small-world consecruence -would be the minimum of the utilities of the large-world consequences to which it might shape up; and it need not be demonstrated that this leads to all sorts of absurd and intuitively unacceptable results. In fact, nobody, even no adherent of maximinimizing, has ever seriously considered this reduction method. That is, maximinimizing was held to be reaSonably applicable only to small-world descriptions of adecision situation, which are already obtained by Savage's reduction method of forming expected utilities. Or more briefly, what is maximinimized are always expected utilities (with respect to some large-world description) . This is particularly clear in game theory where the utilities contained inthe normal fOIm usually are expected utilities derived from the ext~msive form.
Thus, the theoretical muddle turning up with the decision rule of maximinimizing is profounder than it seemed. First, the muddle was that various decision rules seemed to be appropriate to various decision situations without there being any unifying principles. But now, when de- around? (This makes a difference; the two methods are not cornmutative.) And so on. All this is very awkward, and we should try everything to avoid this muddle.
A final word: Von Neumann's version of 3, the "betweenity"-argument, ···has more the air of being rigorous than Charlie's intuitive reasoning.
But it is not. In the minorant game Charlie knows that Lucy will know .•••. what he will do, and in the majorant game he will know what Lucy will do and he also knows that Lucy knows this, etc. In the real game situation he has no such knowledge, i.e. he is epistemically worse off than in both the minorant and the majorant game. (This also means, however, that in terms of expected utility he may be better off than in the other two games.) In this respect the real game is not "between" the minorant and the majorant game, and there seems to be little chance to render the < "betweenity"-argument correct (as is also argued by McClennen (1976) way for the present. This instability of equilibrium points in mixed strategies (which indicates that part 2 of the story, even if unobjectionable, cannot be smoothly carried over to part 4) has also worried Harsanyi in his (1973) article to which we shall return.
The arguments usually added are of no help here. The secrecy argument that randomizing is good for hedging against clever opponents 9 is a nonstarter, since, as (normal form) game situations are usually described, Thepoint, however, is that as such they do not contribute to foundation-oriented theorizing. And there mixed strategies taken as possible choices of the players can be safelyneglected for the reasons mentioned.
How to Make Sense of Game Theory (continued)
We could have evaded all this trouble by strictly sticking to the decision theoretic position. Then we would have to speIl out full decision models for the players which force us to explicitly state all our assumptions, in particular the epistemic ones, about the players and to 250 . : ': rigorously deduce the rational choices from them by the rule of maximizing expected utility instead of reasoning by plausibility. Thus, part 1 of the story would be as precise as desired. Part 2 would be still in force, though in its weakened form stated in the commentary to it. The , muddle of part 3 would be cleared up at once. And we would never had the idea of resorting to mixed strategies. ; and in the same way, a 3 is eliminated by
by RUM 4 (that solves the problem for Charlie) , and finally a Z by RUM 5 (that solves the problem for LUCy, too). To generalize: If the RUMs effect to eliminate all but one alternative of a player, then the alternative left can only be his equilibrium strategy. Unfortunately, the games in which RUM is so effective are of rather special character. For example, all RUM together is powerless in the following typical game:
Here, RUM 1 does not eliminate anything, and then no RUM can. 'l'here is the snag of the Bayesian position. According to the ' standard story, the somewhat vagile assumptions of part 1 seem to justify equilihrium or maximin strategies for all two-person zero-sum games in guite , " convincing a way. Now, under adecision theoretic exactification these assumptions condense to RUMs; but the RUMs are weak and do not knock down but the most special cases. For non~Bayesians this settles the matter, and even Bayesians start to roll at this point. But in my view, any departure from the decision theoretic path is theoretically disastrous ' for the reasons mentioned, Thus, as equilibrium strategies seem and are widely held to be reasonable, the task can only be to strengthen RUM bysome plausible assumption from which the equilibrium strategies may be proved to be rational. The assumption I am going to state is, I think, the one which is closest to the spirit of standard game theory; in fact, it will be so trivial an adaption that you will be disappointed:
The trouble with our second example was that, according to RUM, Charlie's and Lucy's epistemic states concerning the other's actions were , not restricted at all, and that each of his or her alternatives was op-, timal with respectto some epistemic state. Thus, we should introduce some restrietion concerning these epistemic states. One way to do this is to strengthen RUM to RUE , i.e. the assumption that not only the n n rationality of Charlie and Lucy and their utilities, but also their epistemic states concerning the other's actions are mutual knowledge of some order n among them. A bit more fOl:mally, this amounts to the following theorems which in fact apply to all two-person games in normal form, Denote the set of 
6)
,i·,' ( 7 ) (8 ) , ( 9) Charlie is rational, Lucy is rational, -his utility 'function for A1xA2 is V 1 ' her ,utility function for A 1 xA 2 isV 2 (not necessarily his subjective probability function for A 2 is P l , -, her subjective probability function for Al 1S P2'
( 1 ' ) he firmly believes that (2'), ( 3' ) he firmly believes that she firmly believes that
, , 4') -(9') as (4) - (9) with the roles of Charlie and Lucy interchanged, Charlie's mixed strategy 8 1 = P z and Lucy's mixed strategy s2 ~ P l are in equilibrium,
) ( 11) he chooses a pure strategy which is best against 8 2 ~ P 1 '
(11 ') she chooses . a pure st' rategy which is best against s 1 ~ P 2 '
Then we have the following "intrapersonal" theorem (in the sense that ..•. it speaks only about one person), that (1) - (9) imply (10) and (11), and "the "interpersonal" theorem, that (1) - (6) and (1') -(6') imply (10),
• (11), and (11'),
The proof hardly deserves stating: Let BiS Ai (i~1, 2) be the set of all pure strategies which are best against Sj (j*i) 2 ), Similarly, it follows from (6) -(9), or from ) 3') -(6'), that 8 1
EM( B l
). Hence, 8 1 and 8 2 are in equilibrium, and . finally, (1) and (1'), respectively, entail (11) and (11').
. t used m1'xed strategies only as a I hasten to add that we have JUs . , \ " here formal device (as which they are still useful, of course); P I 1S I ' h d not as something considered only assomething that Char 1e as an ~2 d that be fo rmally equated. Let me also ad Lucy may do, though they may . " b qU1'te tr1'v1'ally generalized to all n-perso n that these "theorems may e games in normal form. that I think their form to My reason for stating the "theorems was be paradigmatic of game theoretic theorems. They characterize a player by a full decision model in which both his desires and his beliefs are, described as detailed as is needed; and they uncompromisingly take max~-rule. Thus, they are strict rnizing expected utility as the only decision f t 11 deman ds arisen from the ly Bayesian, and as such they con orm 0 a criticism in the preceding section. , .
". Andthey should not be blamed for their eonelusions (11) and (11'), r think, though this conclusion is not eompletely determinate for games without an equilibrium point in pure strategies. Standard game theory is equally unspecifie with respeet to pure strategies, and it was already clear that within a Bayesian aecount we cannot achieve more speeifie results by allowing mixed strategies. Thus, this much indeterminateness is unavoidable, and there is no ground for disappointment in this respect.
But, presumably, you will blame them for their premises, though you will certainly grant that the premises accord to the spirit of standard game theory. Referring to the "intrapersonal" theorem, the premises (1), (2), (4), (5), (7), and (8) are part of RUM 2 , which is accepted in game theory anyway; (3), (6), and (9) also confoLn, to the general tendency . to assume publicness of its assumptions, and, in particular, they account for the fear of being transparent to the opponent, which game :',), ...
,;i" . ' . theory imputes to the players.
\'" , However, one will retort, it is not at all in the spirit of, but raXi/,i , ther a caricature of game theory to take (3), (6), and (9), though true ";,),'pf rational players, as premises, because thereby i t is outright pre-, '!:!,uPPosedwhat game theory does, or strives to, establish by showing that Another blame might be that (3), (6), and (9) are much more implauthe others (though this is rather the opposite that (3), (6), and (9) were presupposed instead of proved). Three remarks are pertinent here: sible assumptions than · of the preceding blame First, all.of (1)-(9) are id l' . ea l.zatl.ons, of course. But there is no reason at all, why (3), (6 ) , d ( 9) h Id an s ou be graver idealizations than the other assumptions. Thus, this cannot be the point this blame is di- ,,,' · ·:.c.
not a subject we n e ed to engage with. ) Seeondly, it 1s hard to say gene rally, wh ether (5) or (6), or whether (8) or (9), is the more eritieal assumption of our theorems, sinee it seems tO ,be impossible to make any general, subs t antial assertion as to beliefs or desires of other persons are more easily k nowable; this need not be argued, I think.
And a third thing to note 1s that it would not b e quite correct to that the surp lus of RUE as against RUM consists in t he mu tual knowof the pl ayers' epistemic stat es, since usual l y s o me such thing already contained in RUM. That is, if agame has chance moves, then players' eplsternic states concerning these c hance moves are ass umed , RUM to be mutually known, because RUM then requires e xpe eted utilito be mutually known. Yet despite these defensive remarks, ( 6) and ( 9) still seem to be problematic than (5) and (8 ) -at l e ast in the usual examples for person game s (and this cannot be dismissed by saying that t he e xarnwould be biasedl. This is support ed by the following conside rations: Firstly, the assumption th a t th e players' e p i stemie state s conce rning moves aremutually known s e ems to be inn o cuous in many (though in all) situations -e.g. for chance rnov e s like throwing o f d i ce, also when the sub j ective probabilities concerning a c h ance move can-, be so easily taken as reflecting the know l edge o f th e object ive p roabilities f or that chance move, and even wh e n there are no objective 'Lii'ti e s for the chance move i n question. Fo r ins t ance, a chance might be whether Snoopy i s just searching f o r the Red Baron, a n d ' . then we mi ght imagine Charlie t O reason as folIows: "Snoopy has started s,earching yesterday, and usual l y it takes hirn days. So, very probably, ay to a de gree of .9, he is sti l l on search. Now, since LUcy and I t ogether observed hirn mounti ng his Sopwith Camel y e sterday, I know h e r, she knows me, to know that Snoopy has started yeste rday. Moreov er, .. . . she knows h i rn almost as weIl as r do, and she knows how weIl I knovl hirn; thus she wi l l guess my probabil ity about Snoopy correctly , and sh e herself will have about the same probability." Whenever suc h considerations are appropriate, at least s e eond orde r mu tual know le dge of t h e pl a yers' b el i e fs about a chance move may b e plausibly assumed. Similarly, mutual knowle d ge o f ut i liti e s oft e n seems unproblernat ic. Thus, imagine Charl i e a n d Lucy playing rnatching penni es; here is a n other e . f Ch li t bl' h' ( 2) . ( 5), a nd (8 ) f or this p lay : asy rea sonl..ng 0 ar e es a l.S l.ng · , "r give no quarter, I want to win. So, my utilities stand firm. Now, Lu cy knows h uman n a tur e quite weIl, and mine in partieul ar. Men are after money,. and I am no t so d iffer en t, afte r all. Thus, sh e wi ll know my , " , .. :. , -. :. , . : .
• "" _ ' ,' r , I , ,
preferences. But she is not so d'ff . . ' . . 1-erent, too, she has proved it often enough. So, her utilities should be contrary to mine _ "
In contrast to these two reasonings let , , ' us see whether there is S1ffi11ar reasoning for (3) (6) and ( . . evidence he has, and then P 1 addi tionally, oug.h n~t accidentally, proves to be so compatible.)
.. However, as the discussion in section 6 drives us exactly to the same ,
' . a ~ J. t up in more ' detail , we have to admit that we are still whichare as natural as those both blames against a1lowing later on. Thus, for the moment lacking grounds for (3), (6), and (9) are not yet fu1ly answered.
, .
for ' (2), (5), and (8), and hence, that , " :' . . ".
,
'-" ( ' ,.
• , ' " ,' , ' , . "
, But we just found also some loose ends of the Bayesian story, and it may seem as if, in order totiethem up, we might be forced to fall back on , the received story. So let me belabour the whole subject once more at a , .
I, somey;hat, deE!per level, 1.e. by considering the conceptions of rationali-. 't.y on which the different positions are based, and let me take up the story first: In fact, there does not seem to be a very definite conception of ralying behind standard game theory. Another way of developing ' . concept of rationality was much preferred in decision and game theory related fields at leastduring the fifties and sixties. The first e, born from a sensible suspicion of any grand picture, was not to udge the, subject by any comprehensive, but rash conception of raity. Rather, a cautious step-by-step reasoning should lead to a eflective equilibrium, as Rawls (1971) , pp.48ff., termed it, of intuiand systematic arguments. Thus, one started with some intuitively compelling assumptions, d'isplayed their deductive conseguences, ized whether any of these consequences were intuitively unreason-, le, eventually dropped the weakest assumptions, tried to add new asumptions, checked them in the same way, distinguished basic and derived sumptions, and so on. In this way, a stock of basic principles such as . the transitivity of preferences and the sure thing principle (and of basic principles like those of the maximin variety which were tailored to more special situations) emerged which cou1d then very confi-• ". dently be claimed to characterize rationality; and though these principles were never supposed to exhaust the concept of rationality, they proved to be guite powerful. Indeed, for decisions under certainty and . . .. under risk this method has yielded complete success; for decisions under uncertainty the results were illurninating, though not unanimously agreed .
• ' ũpon; and at least the simpler game situations were satisfactorily dealt " wi th .
I hope this was not too distorted a description of the actual proce-. dure, whose only weakness iS, I think, that it seems to be lacking a bit • cf conceptual clarity; it is not fu1ly transparent exactly wh at is there driven to areflective eguilibriurn. This has come to bear particularly on game theory, or so at least Itry to argue in the seguel. In order to get a bit clearer, we have, I think, to observe two or . three rather obvious facts about rationality. First of all, we must strictly distinguish between the rationality of actions. the rationality of beliefs, and perhaps the rationality of desires and separately discuss them. . Let us consider action rationality first, which is the declared sub-
257
."
", -""' ,,_ , ;14'~ ,
,,~~, ',, _,J, "', "
. . . . ject of decisioI). and game theory. The . important thing. here is that whether an action of a person is rational or not can only' be determined relative to the subjective desires and beliefs of that person. This is .
clear from everyday experience; whenever we happen upon an action which plainly seems to be irrational, we might have to withdraw our judgment, when the actor, or somebody familiar to hirn, explains us his reasons for this action. And it is clear from philosophical literature which has repeatedly pointed out this fact.
13
Now one may call an action rational, .. only if it is rationall,y linked wi th beliefs and desires which themselves are rational. But this is merely a terminological quest ion. There is . a certain relation between actions on the one hand and beliefs and desires, whatever they may be, on the other hand; and it seems preferable, and I shall do so here, to call an action rational, whenever it bears . , , this relation to the given beliefs and desires. Which action exactly 1s
, rational in this sense, usually is the result of a big weighing in which ' . each ' of the given
beliefs and desires may in principle become relevant. course; but it is a well-defined task t o clear this '" irhis i8 vague, of . 1!1I>, and it is quite a different task (which is not yet out topic) to in-, , vestigate the rationality of beliefsand desires .
• .' This one observation has two conseouences for uso One is that, when
• . dealing with action rationality, we really should entertain a subjectivistic interpretation of probability. For there will not be very rnuch what can be said about action rationality independently of a person's • " sUbjective beliefs; decisions under uncertainty as weIl as game situastandard story simply seem to be underpoint of view. But if a person's beliefs , tions as characterized in the determined problems from this are to be explicitly regarded, then we have somehow to conceptualize these beliefs; and probability measures are ' a good way, to put it weak-. 1Y, of such conceptualization. This goes without saying in philosophy, I think, but, strangely, it still seems t o need some stressing among game theorists and econornists.
In fact, the aversion to subjective probabilities is present in all of standard game theory. It is apparent in the conception and handling of . chance moves, it shows up in the fact that the actions of others are not considered as subject of a player's probabilities, and it finds general expression in the stepchild-like treatment of the whole epistemic make-up of the players. The re is no doubt that stand ard game theory has tided over this lack of the unloved subjective probabilit ie s by brilliant substitutes, but it is equally clear, I think, that this aversion is the mai n cause for the incoherencies present in the standard story. And it h b as 0 scured the "reflective equilibrium"-approach to rationality
The second consequence is that, if we are keen on capt uring action 'rationali ty in a mathematical model, we are almost automatically led to ision theory. For the most natural way to mirror t h at big wei gh ing . " subjective beliefs and desires is to conceptualize them in some quantative way'; the practically unrivaled candidates for such a quantitave conceptualization are, ofcourse, probability measures and utility ctions; and then the Bayesian rule of maximizing expected utility is most plausible and mathematically simplest model of that weighing sand itsoutcome. Of course, this consideration alone cannot esdecision theory; but since the solid "reflective equilibrium"-undwork has already done all to support this mathematical model, it be put that simply.
What is important now is that this model gives us a eomptete account an action being rational relative to given beliefs and desires. That , any other account working within a comparable conceptualization is ther entailed by or contradicts the decision theoretic account. trictly speaking, this is not quite true; there may be ties according decision theory; andin these cases, but onlyin these cases, another may be compatible with decision theory without being entailed it. ) All that comes to this: We might perhaps quarrel with the received -lization of subjective belie fs and desires. But if we do not, we cannot do full justice to action rationali ty when vlOrking wi th than full decision models, and we have all we need for a complete acterization of action rationality when working with full decision dels. Hence, from this general perspective too, we have no good choice to keep a strict decision theoretic course in game theory as everyelse where rational action is at issue. Now it is at last time to submit the conjecture that game theory was ted not so much in action rationality inthe weak sense discussed ;
. ust now, but in the stronger sense of being also based on rational beefs and perhaps on rational desires. The rationality of desires, howi,i ever, is a very dirn subject. There exists a not totally unclear notion 'of adesire being rational relative to other given d e si r es, according to whether the first might be inferred from the latter by rational beliefs. But whether there is also some way of judging the rationality of ".. desires absolutely -this is an open question remin iscent of the grave ethical problem whether there are such things as objective values. In this situation it is wise not to presuppose absolutely rational desires, and this is, of course, wh at every decision or game theorist has done
by taking preferences and utillty functions as subjeetively given. Thus, we have only to diseuss epistemie rationality to which we finally turn.
6. The Real I'ssue's (conti' nued)
First, I should briefly mention a familiar point (in order to forget ' about it sUbsequently), namely that the decision theoretic account of action rationality already assumes a formal minimum of epistemic rationality, i.e. that subjective probabilities behave like mathematical probabilities. But this was taken for granted all the time; of course, we now have in mind a material property whieh goes beyond this.
' Actually, it is not so clear that standard game theory really is concerned with epistemic rationality and not only with action rationality. At least, I could not find good evidence for this in the standard references (like von Neumann, Morgenstern (1944) or Luce, Raiffa (1957»; ihis mayaiso have to do with the somewhat undifferentiated "reflective equilibrium"-approach to explicating rationality. But the impression ,from the end of section 4 that our Bayesian story somehow did not do full justice to the standard story points to this concern. The issue becomes much clearer, when we look at what Harsanyi has written from his kind of Bayesian approach to game theory. For instance, in (1965), p.450, he says: "The basic difficulty in defining rational behavior in game situation s i5 the fact that in general each player's strategy will depend on his expectations about the other players' strateg ies. Could we assume that his expectations were given, then his problem of strategy choice would become an ordinary maximization problem: he could simply choose a strategy maximizing his own payoff on the assumption that the other players would act in accordance with his given expectations. But the point is that game theory cannot regard the players' expectations ab out each oth-' er's behavior as given; rather, one of the most important problems for game ,theory is precisely to decide what expectations intelligent players can rationally entertain about other intelligent players' behavior. This may be called the problem of mutual 'rational expectations'."
In order to solve that problem, he proposes i n (19 66) not only "postulates of rational behavior in a narrower sense", but also "postulates of rational expectat i ons"; on p.621 he is t hen very explicit in stating that thes e postulates imply "that t h e only variables i nfluen cing the (ii) the Bubje c ti ve p rob a bi Zi t 7:e s e ach player asslgns to different :outcomes being accepted or rejected bythe other p l ayer(s).
Among these variables, only those mentioned under (i ) are in de pe n d e n ' t , riables while the variables under (ii) are themselves determined by e variables under (i)." This last claim is all-important to Harsanyi's approach and to stand-, game theory as weIl. And I think it is basically wrong. (In fact, if ' "did not think so, I eould have forborne this paper.) However, I ,eannot th i s strictly, since to this end I had to show for each principle epistemic rationality one might plausibly entertain that it does not from (i) to (ii), and since, with the exception of some basiC prines, there is not much a greement as to which principles should be entained. Epistemic rationality is just much less elucidated than action , ' tionality. No wonder, it is the time-honoured, but still acute problem induction in its full philosophical generality. But I shall try to plausible why I think Harsanyi's claim to be wrong. Let me start recalling some facts about epistemi c rationality. o" Firstly, it is clear that one cannot talk absolutely of beliefs b e ing ional or not. A person's belief can be said to be rational only in lation to the evidence this person has. Part of this relation is expliin deduct i ve logie; whatever follows deductively from th e evidence, rationally to be believed. Inductive logic and statistics as weIl are both more con t roversial) have tried to clear up more of this . Here it has become apparent that the rat i onality of some epistate depends also on the prior epistemic state, i:e. that one distingu i sh the problem of rational belief change -how is a prior istemic state rationally to be modified in the l i ght of new evidence? -the problem of assessing the rationality of the prior epistemie te -which is themore difficult one. Actually, epistemic rationality still more complicated; for example, it certainly depends a l so on the e in which the beliefs are represented. But such profound intriies are not relevant for our discussion.
•
Returning now to Harsanyi's claim, let us imagine agai n that Charlie d ' ormal form and assume some Lucy are engage in some zero-sum game ~n n , l ' t ) Let us sup-(where the "R" still stands only f or action rat~ona ~ Y . ' pose that this does not yet solve the game (Le. t h at th e game is like , do better in this respect. The same holds true of Lucy when we assume her to be epistemically rationa1. But then it is of no help to Charlie either to believe Lucy to be epistemically rational. And so on. Thus, even if we additionally assume that epistemic rationality is mutual knowledge of some order among Charlie and Lucy, we are not led to infer that they have the subjective probabilities which game theory would like them to have. And this is contrary to Harsanyi's claim that we would be led to infer so, i.e. that the utilities together with all the rationality we might wish (and with mutual knowledge ot all this) would determine the subjective probabilities. Of course, this reasoning does not at all exclude that the assurnption of epistemic rationality might be quite effective, when Charlie and Lucy are granted other or more evidence than RUM alone. But instead of criticizing Harsanyi's claim we should perhaps better look at how he sUpports it. In his (1966) paper, however, from which I have qu.oted his claim, I have found no such support. There his rationality postulates indeed quite obviously imply that the players' actions depend only on (i) and ( Perhaps our interest is answered by the theory which he has recently developed together with Reinhard Selten, and which, proposes a new twostage procedure towards solving n-person non-cooperative games (cf. Harsanyi (1975) and (1976»: "First, a pr' i or subjective probability di8tribution Pi is assigned to the pure strategies of each player i, meant to represent the other players' initial expectations ab out player i's likely strategy choice. Then, a mathematical procedure, called the tracing proc edure, is used to define the solution on the basis of these prior distributions p •• The tracing procedure is meant to provide a mathematical representation for the soLution proo e 8 S by which rational players manage to coordinate their strategy plans and their expectations, and make them converge to one specific equilibrium point as solution for t he game." (Harsanyi (1976), p.211.) 
